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Eibach, Libby, and Gilovich’s (2003) experimental research suggested that people with less 
self-change awareness will perceive that their social worlds change more than do those who 
are more aware that they themselves are changing. This present review, based on two other 
studies, serves as a further research recommendation to expand their thesis. Social cognition 
experiments conducted by Cloutier and Macrae (2008) as well as by Hess and Pickett (2010) 
using the social memory paradigm indicated that if a person experiences: (1) personal disen-
gagement (self-univolvement, i.e. his/her experience is chosen by others); and (2) social 
rejection, then he/she will be less aware of him/herself, and will remember more (or is more 
aware of) information regarding other people (others > self). Reversely, a person with: (1) 
self-involvement (i.e. selects his/her own experience); and (2) social acceptance experience, 
will be more aware of him/herself than of others (self > others) and will perceive the social 
world to change less. Based on those findings, the authors hypothesize that self-involvement 
and social rejection–as variables that influence the awareness of self (changes)–influence 
one’s perception of social changes. Some applications related to colonial mentality, as well as 
Bitcoin and blockchain technology, are presented as illustrations to elaborate the conjecture. 
 
Keywords: social change, self-change, awareness, self-involvement, social rejection, 
philosophical psychology, social memory 
 
Penelitian eksperimental Eibach, Libby, dan Gilovich (2003) menunjukkan bahwa orang dengan 
ketidaksadaran perubahan diri akan mempersepsi dunia sosialnya berubah lebih banyak 
daripada orang yang menyadari bahwa dirinya berubah. Kontribusi kajian kali ini adalah se-
bagai rekomendasi penelitian lanjutan yang memperluas tesis mereka. Eksperimen kognisi 
sosial yang diselenggarakan oleh Cloutier dan Macrae (2008) serta Hess dan Pickett (2010) 
dengan menggunakan paradigma ingatan sosial menunjukkan bahwa apabila orang mengalami: 
(1) ketidakterlibatan diri (pengalamannya dipilihkan oleh orang lain); dan (2) pengalaman 
penolakan sosial, maka ia akan kurang menyadari dirinya, dan lebih mengingat atau menya-
dari informasi yang terkait dengan orang lain (yang lain > diri). Demikian pula terjadi pada 
arah sebaliknya, orang dengan: (1) keterlibatan diri (memilih pengalamannya sendiri); dan 
(2) pengalaman penerimaan sosial akan lebih menyadari dirinya daripada orang lain (diri > 
yang lain), dan akan mempersepsikan dunia sosial berubah lebih sedikit. Berbasiskan temuan-
temuan tersebut, penulis berhipotesis bahwa keterlibatan diri dan penolakan sosial–sebagai 
variabel-variabel yang mempengaruhi kesadaran tentang (perubahan) diri–mempengaruhi 
persepsi seseorang terhadap perubahan sosial. Sejumlah penerapan pengetahuan terkait 
dengan mentalitas kolonial serta Bitcoin dan teknologi blockchain dijadikan ilustrasi untuk 
memperjelas dugaan tersebut. 
 
Kata kunci: perubahan sosial, perubahan diri, kesadaran, keterlibatan diri, penolakan sosial, 
psikologi filosofis, ingatan sosial 
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Various social psychology studies suggested that 
social perception is prone to bias (e.g., Bargh & 
Pietromonaco, 1982; Moskowitz, 2005; Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977). Eibach and Libby (2009) found that 
when a person becomes a parent, that person sees 
the world as a more dangerous place, but fails to re-
cognize that his/her personal/self-change is the thing 
responsible for that perception. Once parents start to 
have children, their children’s safety is at stake, and 
this vulnerability affects perceptions of hazards in the 
environment. People also fail to be aware that their 
view which sees a current social decline is influen-
ced by their physical and mental condition which 
experiences changes, known as aging. As a result, 
they feel they experience more frustration concern-
ing the world’s changes. Juneman and Takwin (2011) 
found that the lower personal change awareness col-
lege students have, the more they perceive that their 
campus world changes a lot. 
Eibach, Libby, and Gilovich (2003) further found 
that even though one is made aware of his/her changes, 
attribution errors in the number of social changes will 
happen if one does not possess enough cognitive re-
sources, such as a condition caused by cognitive over-
load. One needs to reflect and exercise cognitive ef-
fort to recognize that his/her own personal changes 
have changed his/her perception of social world chan-
ges. Cognitive overload brings about attenuation ef-
fects on personal change awareness. Following the 
logic of their thesis, this present review hypothesizes 
that every variable which can bring about attenuation 
of personal awareness can serve as a psychological 
variable which causes people to make exaggerated 
judgments on world or social changes. This review in-
spires future empirical researchers to find and con-
firm the roles of the variables. 
Previous studies showed that self-involvement im-
proves information memorability regarding the self 
(objects-associated-with-self > objects-associated-with-
other) (e.g., Macrae, Moran, Heatherton, Banfield, & 
Kelley, 2004). It is known as the self-reference effect/ 
SRE in memory (Symons & Johnson, 1997), which 
is caused by a state experienced by the people who 
think that they are the actors or authors of their own 
behaviors. Cloutier and Macrae (2008) sharpened tho-
se findings. They found out the kind of self-involve-
ment which improves information memorability and 
accessibility is self-involvement which is moderated 
by the act of choosing. The experiment they conducted 
showed that, compared to participants whose infor-
mation was selected by a partner (others) or was ma-
terial pre-assigned by experimenters (others), parti-
cipants who played active roles in selecting related 
information (selecting > assigned) remembered more. 
People who selected their own experience (volitional, 
self-involved, people as agents) are more self-aware 
than those whose experience is not selected by them-
selves (assigned to self, e.g. undergo given experi-
ence, do/experience particular things because they 
are required or forced to do so). In other words, 
people who experience self-disengagement (uninvol-
vement) will focus their attention more on others or 
the social world (other > self). 
Twenge, Catanese, and Baumeister’s (2003) study 
found that people who are socially rejected will avoid 
personal awareness and will think more of what might 
be wrong about them-which has caused others to re-
ject them. Regarding this, the Gestalt psychological 
concept states that social rejection causes the suffer-
ers to feel that they change from figures into back-
grounds because their condition is seen as no longer 
ideal/positive; it causes people to be less self-focus-
ed (Snow, Duval, & Sylvia, 2004). This is because 
people who are socially rejected will experience acute 
distress, which they need to develop a defensive stra-
tegy to protect themselves from distress. Distress is 
caused by a negative self-concept as a result of so-
cial rejection. Therefore, people need to restore their 
positive self-concept. The most common way to do 
this is by self-forgetting (so that they do not need to 
face the memory of weaknesses and failure in the eyes 
of society, which have happened), and at the same time 
improve their attention to the social world (so that 
they can be helped to shape and maintain social rela-
tionships, which can satisfy their willingness to stay 
connected to the social world). Hess and Pickett (2010) 
found similar results, that people who are socially 
rejected demonstrate better memory of other-related 
social behavior, but a bad memory of self-related so-
cial behavior, when compared with people who are 
socially accepted. This is because social rejection trig-
gers responses in the form of self-defense strategies 
aimed to restore and maintain social relationships. It 
could be concluded that social rejection triggers the 
act of disengagement from the self and more atten-
tion being given to others or to the social world, si-
milarly to the effects of self-uninvolvement. 
This present review hypothesizes that self-unin-
volvement and social rejection influence one’s per-
ception of social changes in positive directions. 
 
Plausible Operationalization 
 
In order empirically to test the hypothesis among  
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university students, this review suggests predictive 
correlational design with self-involvement and social 
rejection as predictors (independent variables), and 
perception of social change as a criterion (dependent 
variable). 
Perception of a social change scale could be de-
veloped based on the perspectives of higher educa-
tion parties (Juneman & Takwin, 2011), such as: (1) 
Lecturers, e.g., “So far, the campus world has expe-
rienced changes in lecturer quality”; (2) Students, 
e.g., “The campus world has experienced many chan-
ges regarding between-student relationships”; (3) 
Staff, e.g., “The campus world has experienced many 
changes in its staff behavior”; and (4) The university, 
e.g., “The campus world has experienced many chan-
ges in terms of facilities.” The scale would consist of 
10 statements, with responses ranging from “Strongly 
Disagree” (scored 1) to “Strongly Agree” (scored 5). 
The Modified Involvement Scale (MIS) by Kyle, 
Absher, Norman, Hammitt, and Jodice (2007) could 
be used to measure self-involvement. The 15-item 
scale’s dimensions, making: (1) social bonding, e.g., 
“Participating in the campus world gives me an op-
portunity to be with my friends”; (2) identity affir-
mation, e.g., “When I participate in the campus world, 
I can really be myself”; (3) identity expression, e.g., 
“Participating in the campus world explains many 
things about who I am”; (4) attraction, e.g., “The cam-
pus world is one of the most exciting things in my 
life”; and (5) centrality, such as, “To replace the cam-
pus activities I like with other activities, I would need 
to think it over deeply.” The response options would 
range from “Strongly Disagree” (scored 1) to “Strongly 
Agree” (scored 5). 
The social rejection scale could be adapted and de-
veloped, based on construct aspects in The Rejection 
Sensitivity Questionnaire (RSQ) by Downey and 
Feldman (1996). The RSQ consists of 18 situations 
with two dimensions, making a total of 36 statements. 
The 18 situations describe things with which college 
students sometimes ask others to help. The first di-
mension is anxious expectations of rejection, with 
the responses ranging from “Not Very Worrying/Not 
Very Concerned About” (scored 1) to “Very Worry-
ing/Very Concerned About” (scored 6). The second 
dimension is self-expectation of the possibility of 
acceptance by significant others with the responses 
ranging from “Very Unlikely” (scored 1) to “Very 
Likely” (scored 6). Examples of the RSQ items are 
given in Table 1. Refer to http://www.midss.org/rsq 
rs-personal-8-item-and-18item (Downey & Feldman, 
1996) for RSQ scoring. Some situations given in the 
scale should be adapted to Indonesian situations to 
get the same psychological effect, or be similar to 
the situations cited in the source instrument. Some 
of these could be adapted from: (a) a situation such 
as: “You ask your boyfriend/girlfriend to move in 
with you” adapted to become, “You ask your friend 
to build a new business with you”; (b) a situation 
such as: “After graduation you can’t find a job and 
you ask your parents if you can live at home for a 
while”, adapted to “After graduation, you ask your 
parents if it is possible for you to become engaged 
to your boy/girlfriend even though you do not have 
a job”; and (c) a situation such as: “You ask a friend 
to go on vacation with you over Spring Break” adapt-
ed to “You ask a friend to go with you over a re-
ligious holiday.” 
The data can be analyzed using multiple linear re-
gression analysis, with self-involvement and social 
rejection as predictors, and perception of social change 
as the criterion. It is expected that the social change 
perception of those who experienced self-disengage-
ment would experience more overestimation bias than 
that of those who experienced self-involvement, and 
that the perception of social change of those who ex-
perienced social rejection would experience more over-
estimation bias than that of those who experienced 
social acceptance. 
The results of the correlational study could be tri-
angulated with a true experimental study with 2 x 2 
factorial design (see Table 2) with self-involvement 
(involved/selected vs. not involved/selected) and so-
cial rejection (accepted vs. rejected) as independent 
variables (causes) and perception of social change 
as the dependent variable (effect) to confirm causal 
relationship. The Cyberball-tossing game (Williams, 
Cheung, & Choi, 2000; Zadro, Williams, & Richardson, 
2004) could be used as the assessment instrument. 
Self-involvement is operationalized as “the experi-
ence to choose the number of players and opponents 
in the Cyberball game which involves the campus 
world community”, whereas self-uninvolvement ser-
ves as “the experience of having others choose the 
number of players and opponents in the Cyberball game 
involving the campus world community.” Social re-
jection is operationalized as “the rejected experience 
in the Cyberball game involving the campus world 
community”, while social acceptance serves as “ac-
ceptance experience in the Cyberball game involving 
the campus world community”. 
The suggested procedure is as follows: Experimen-
ters go into a class where participants are gathered 
and explained that the participants will be involved 
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in a research project, and ask for their agreement. 
The experimenters offer lotteries (tickets) with C1 
to C4 code. The participants are asked to take a tic-
ket at random. After that, the participants are asked 
to execute a program file on their computers. The 
experimenters explain that the participants will play 
the Cyberball-tossing game with their “partners” in 
a parallel laboratory at the same time (synchronously, 
in real-time) using the internet. Experimenters then 
display a list of “students” (attendance list) in the 
parallel laboratory on a slide at the front of the class 
[This is one deception part of the experiment]. In 
the game program, the participants are asked to fill 
in an online form, based on their preferences. The 
Table 1 
Example of RSQ Items (Downey & Feldman, 1996) 
Situation Item 
You ask someone in class if you can borrow his/ 
her notes. 
1. How concerned or anxious would you be over whether or not the 
person would want to lend you his/her notes? 
 
2. I would expect that the person would willingly give me his/her 
notes. 
 
After class, you tell your professor that you have 
been having some trouble with a section of the 
course and ask if he/she can give you some extra 
help.  
1. How concerned or anxious would you be over whether or not 
your professor would want to help you out? 
 
2. I would expect that my professor would want to help me out. 
 
 
Table 2 
Suggested Experimental Design 
 Self-Involvement 
Selecting Experience Assigned Experience 
Social Rejection 
Being accepted experience 
C1 
Perception of social change 
C3 
Perception of social change 
Being rejected experience 
C2 
Perception of social change 
C4 
Perception of social change 
Note.    C = Condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of player and opponents’ position in the experimental game 
(Williams et al., 2000; Zadro et al., 2004) 
 
Opponent Label 
Opponent Label Opponent Label 
Player Label (Participant) 
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data to be filled in are: (a) a nickname; (b) the num-
ber of players (three or four people) [the total number 
of players includes both the participants and their op-
ponents]; (c) lottery number (C1 / C2 / C3 / C4); 
and (d) the names of the second and third players (if 
the total number of player is three) or the names of 
the second, third, and fourth players (if the total num-
ber of players chosen is four), who are in the paral-
lel laboratory. The names of the opponents may be 
freely chosen by participants from the attendance 
list on the slide. As a deception procedure, partici-
pants are told that they are going to participate in 
research testing a mental visualization effect. To help 
them train their mental visualization skills, they are 
to play an online Cyberball-tossing game using the 
Internet Explorer browser. They are told that their 
performance in tossing the ball is not important be-
cause the game is a means for them to practice their 
mental visualization skills. They are asked to imagine 
themselves, their opponents, and the game situation. 
They are asked to freely imagine such things as how 
the other players perform, what kind of people the 
other players are, where the game is being played, and 
how the weather conditions are (warm, cold, rainy, or 
maybe sunny). They are asked to create a complete men-
tal image of what is happening as if they are playing 
the game in real life. Participants’ position is always in 
the middle-lower position and the participants are ask-
ed to toss a ball to another opponent as soon as they 
receive it (see Figure 1). The game is displayed using 
animation, wherein player icons toss a ball to each 
other. Each session of the game consists of 30 throws 
(game duration is around 4-5 minutes). 
Around five seconds after the game starts, the ex-
perimenter tells the players that if the name of the 
college students chosen from parallel laboratory did 
not emerge, or there is more than one player who 
chooses the same name, participants will play against 
the experimenter’s team who are monitoring from a 
different place (deception). Soon after this explana-
tion, the experimenter asks, “Is there any one amongst 
you whose requests have not been met? This would 
mean that the number of opponents and/or the name 
of the opponents displayed in the game does not cor-
respond to the players’ requests, as filled in on your 
forms.” Some participants will raise their hands. The 
experimenters’ assistant will quickly respond, saying, 
“It is OK. There are some students in this class who-
se requests or choices have not been granted. Those 
whose requests have not been granted will play aga-
inst our team which is monitoring from a different 
place.” Those whose requests were not granted will 
see A(random number) or B(random number), ra-
ther than the names of the opponents previously se-
lected from the attendance list for the parallel labo-
ratory, on the displayed list of opponents’ names. 
Initially, the experimenter set the game based on 
the lottery number randomly allocated to the partici-
pants (C1 / C2 / C3 / C4). The participants actually 
play with the “program” set by the experimenters, 
but they are told that they will play using an internet 
connection with other “real players”. This is the de-
ception in the research. There are four game condi-
tions randomized for the participants, based on the 
conditions in Table 2. For example, Participant C1 
will play the game set in such a way that he/she re-
ceives: (1) a “selecting” experience (the number and 
the names of the opponents he/she requested were 
granted/appeared in the game display on the compu-
ter screen); and (2) “accepted” experience (partici-
pants randomly received a ball for a quarter of the 
total throws if there were four total players, or a third 
if the total players were three). Participants with C4 
number got: (1) “rejected” experience (participants 
randomly accepted a ball twice at the most from the 
opponents if the total players were three, or three at 
the most if the total players were four); and (2) an 
“assigned” experience (the number and the names of 
opponents he/she requested were not granted. In this 
case, there will be four players, including the parti-
cipants whose names are displayed on the computer 
screen. Therefore, there will be three opponents, and 
the names of the opponents will be different from 
the participant’s requests). This experience is the 
source of the experimental manipulation. 
At the end of the game, Internet Explorer will dis-
play a ‘thank you’ note and a request for the partici-
pants to await the next instructions. After this, the 
experimenter might ask the participants to fill in the 
three post-experiment scales and might conduct a 
debriefing (a more elaborate explanation of the ori-
ginal purpose of the research). 
The first post-experiment scale is a manipulation 
check scale adapted from The Modified Involvement 
Scale (MIS) (Kyle et al., 2007) measuring the par-
ticipants’ involvement. The dimensions are: (1) at-
traction, for example, “After knowing whether or not 
the names of the opponents I requested was granted, 
the game became interesting for me”; (2) centrality, 
such as, “The number and names of the opponents 
displayed has strengthened my willingness to play 
the game”; (3) social bonding, for example, “I felt 
close to my opponents, regardless of how the game 
turned out”; (4) identity affirmation, such as, “When 
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participating in the game, I could be myself”; and 
(5) identity expression, for example, “People will 
know what sort of gamer I am by noting my consi-
derations in choosing the number and opponents.” 
The response options would range from “Strongly 
Disagree” (scored 1) to Strongly Agree” (scored 5). 
The second post-experiment scale is a manipula-
tion check scale, with The Social Rejection Questi-
onnaire as a function of the Cyberball-tossing game 
(Williams et al., 2000; Zadro et al., 2004). The di-
mensions are: (1) Intensity of ostracism, such as, “I 
was: Accepted...... Rejected”; (2) Degree of threat to 
needs (belonging, control, self-esteem, meaningful ex-
istence), for example, “I felt like an ‘outsider’ thro-
ughout the game”, “I felt that I could toss the ball as 
often as I wanted” (unfavorable item), “I felt that o-
ther players failed to perceive me as a valuable and 
nice person”; “(3) Mood, such as “I am: Sad....... 
Happy” (unfavorable item); and (4) Ancillary vari-
ables, for example, “I was angry throughout the ga-
me”. The response options for Dimensions (2) and 
(4) might range from “Strongly Disagree” (scored 
1) to “Strongly Agree” (scored 6). 
The responses of perception of social change sca-
le might range from “Strongly Disagree” (scored 1) 
to “Strongly Agree” (scored 6), and are developed ba-
sed on perceptions of higher education position hol-
ders (Juneman & Takwin, 2011), these being: (1) Lec-
turers; (2) Students; (3) Staff; and (4) University. 
When tested using an independent t-test, there 
should be significant differences in the total score of 
self-involvement between the groups set to choose 
their own experiences (C1, C2) and the groups al-
located assigned experiences (C3, C4) (Mselecting > 
Massigned: indicating self-involvement) as well as be-
tween the groups set to be accepted socially (C1, C3) 
and the groups set to be rejected by others (C2, C4) 
(Maccepted < Mrejected : indicating social rejection). 
ANOVA 2 x 2 between-participants should be con-
ducted to investigate whether there are main effects 
of: (1) self-involvement; and (2) social rejection. If 
significant, a post hoc analysis can be done to show: 
(1) whether the participants who experienced self-
involvement in the game, with the number of oppo-
nents they selected/requested being granted, percei-
ved that the world changed less for them than did 
those who did not feel involved in the game; as well 
as (2) whether the participants experiencing social 
rejection throughout the game perceived that the world 
changed more than did those who experienced so-
cial acceptance. Also, should be conducted as to whe-
ther variance analysis shows interaction effect(s) be-
tween self-involvement and social rejection regarding 
social change perception. Finally, the researchers might 
investigate the degree of the effect size of self-in-
volvement and social rejection variables, based on 
Cohen’s (1988) criteria. 
 
Supports from Other Studies on Social 
Rejection Effects 
 
There are other research findings which might sup- 
port this present review and its derived hypotheses. 
Social rejection takes place in colonialism, as stated 
by the title of Coates and Powell (1989)’s book, The 
Modern North: People, Politics and The Rejection 
of Colonialism. David and Okazaki (2006) found the 
effect of colonialism among Filipino Americans. This 
effect is called “the colonial mentality”, which is cha-
racterized by ethnic and cultural inferiority involving 
“uncritical rejection of anything Filipino and … un-
critical preference of anything American” (David & 
Okazaki, 2006, p. 241). Many Filipino Americans 
use skin whitening products, want to have a white 
complexion, discriminate against non-white people, 
have a superior perception of white people and West-
ern culture, and prefer anything that is white or from 
the West (Bergano & Bergano-Kinney, 1997; Revilla, 
1997). Interestingly, Okazaki, David, and Abelmann 
(2008) stated that, based on David and Okazaki’s 
(2006) study, behaviors and emotions associated with 
colonial mentality can be detected at a subconscious 
level. They found that the stimuli related to the Fili-
pino examples have been associated with the concept 
of inferiority, undesirability, and unpleasantness. 
Meanwhile, the stimuli related to Americans have 
been associated with the concept of superiority, de-
sirability, and pleasantness. The conclusion of their 
study is that cognition in line with colonial mentality 
can occur automatically and subconsciously. The 
findings are concrete examples of the application of 
this present review’s conjecture, that is, how social 
rejection (in this case: colonialism) influences percep-
tion of social world changes (things related to the 
West are perceived to be superior, more pleasant, and 
desirable), even at the level of individual’s subcons-
cious. 
Another piece of research related to social reject-
ion is Goodwin, Williams, and Carter-Sowell’s (2010) 
study. They asked participants to play the Cyberball-
tossing game with manipulations pertaining to feel-
ings of being rejected, accepted, or highly accepted. 
They employed manipulation so that the participants 
believed that their opponents in the game were the 
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members of ‘in-group’ or ‘out-group’ races. Their 
study suggested that socially rejected participants 
(compared to the accepted) attributed social reject-
ion more to racial prejudice. Among whites, this oc-
curred more when their opponents were of an ‘out-
group’ race (dark-skinned). On the other hand, the 
effect among African Americans did not depend on 
whether or not their opponents were from an ‘out-
group’ or an ‘in-group’. In addition, the research find-
ings indicated that after giving attribution, partici-
pants felt less stress (caused by social rejection). 
Participants’ stress became lower because they felt 
they were able to explain why they had been reject-
ed, i.e. their opponents were prejudiced against them. 
This attribution had also taken the form of “rumina-
tive substance” leading participants to focus on their 
experience of being rejected which they had had no 
time to reflect upon for themselves. The Goodwin et 
al.’s (2010) research findings can be explained by 
this present review’s conjecture. Social rejection ma-
kes people who experience it avoid reflective cons-
ciousness of their self-changes which have been threat-
ened by the need for belonging, control, self-esteem, 
and a meaningful existence. Participants did not rea-
lize that their self-changes had made them focus on 
others. Other people are seen to have more prejudice 
and to be more discriminative. 
The practical implication would be for an adver-
tising strategy which “rejects” potential consumers. 
Social rejection could be implemented through a mes-
sage suggesting that if a potential consumer does not 
use the advertised product, he/she will be “margi-
nalized”, excluded from the community, from commu-
nity activity, etc. Such a feeling of rejection might 
heighten the consumer’s perception of the social en-
vironment’s behavioral changes. It might well seem 
that the situation is more positive and nicer (than the 
reality) he/she were to use the advertised products. 
On the other hand, the behavior of other people might 
seem to be more negative if they do not use the pro-
duct. What really causes the effect here is whether 
or not he/she can fulfill needs for a sense of belong-
ing, for control, self-esteem, and a meaningful exist-
ence. Another example might be, for example, a teen-
ager whose love is rejected (unrequited love) by the 
one whom he/she really loves, or a writer who is re-
jected by a publisher who was expected to publish 
his/her work. Such a person may see the world as 
having changed, being no longer friendly, or beco-
ming crueler. These people can be helped to realize 
that the social rejection they experience has decrea-
sed their awareness of their self-changes. They are 
more prone to experience a negative self-concept or 
a fall in their self-esteem owing to rejection, and 
they become more sensitive to every “rejection-rela-
ted” behavior cue around them. This will trigger chro-
nic pressure (stress) if the people fail to recognize 
that it is not the world which changes into a place 
less friendly or crueler to them, but it is their sensi-
tivity which increases, as a form of self-protection 
from repeated rejection experiences. 
 
Supports from Bitcoin Studies on Self-
Involvement Effects 
 
Legault (2017) explained that the acceptance of 
considerable social change in the current economic 
climate, i.e. the presence of Bitcoin (along with the 
Blockchain technology it carries), which can be used 
for both transactions and as a trade commodity, de-
pends on the extent to which one’s involvement in 
one’s own “internal-evolutionary” experience. This 
present review hypothesizes that the higher one’s 
self-involvement towards one’s own experience, this 
being compatible with the characteristics of Bitcoin 
and blockchain technology, the lower the magnitude 
of culture shock one experiences, related to the emer-
gence of the virtual currency. This is in accordance 
with the statement of Kurt and Gök (2015, p. 5, 26-
27) that “technology ... increases the possibility of 
... disappearance of the culture importance .... As the 
technology still evolves, our culture will keep on chan-
ging ....Getting more information on culture and sha-
ring would prepare that person to be aware of the 
culture shock.” 
The experience referred to by Legault (2017) is a 
“relational template”-relevant experience. Associated 
with previous discussions about the effects of self-
involvement and perceptions of social change, it ap-
pears that people who consider Bitcoin and block-
chain as small social changes are the ones who have 
strongly-lived relational templates in their pasts. 
They might be people who have experienced: (1) a 
secure attachment during the first six years of life; 
(2) a decentralized experience, such as by undergoing 
institutional daycare where, during their childhood, 
they had experience of trustworthy authorities other 
than their parents; (3) a blended family, wherein they 
have “more attachment nodes” with the presence of 
step-families; and (4) a secure peerattachment. This 
four-dimensional experience of relational templates 
can enhance one’s self-involvement with the decen-
tralization experience, so that one would not be shock-
ed by disruptive technological developments in the 
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economic field, leading to the decentralization of fi-
nancial authorities which no longer rely on the cen-
tral bank, but on the “shared public ledger” (block-
chain technology). 
Wu (2017, par. 8) explained further, “Many of us 
are fascinated with new technologies, such as artifi-
cial intelligence, augmented reality, virtual reality, 
and robotics, because science fiction story-tellers have 
been feeding us for decades with glorious and terri- 
fying visions of Utopian or Apocalyptic outcomes. 
Our emotions are prepared for either or both direc-
tions”. The narrative is an access to self-involvement/ 
engagement, at least virtually, through the mediation 
of preparedness. In fact, the narratives can construct 
the self, promote one’s roles and goals as actors and 
agents, as well as influence one’s future (Blair, 2016; 
McAdams, Josselson, & Lieblich, 2006). Thus, the 
narrative helps in driving acceptance, adoption, and 
appropriation (see also, Prayoga & Abraham, 2017) 
of technology, by shrinking perceptions about the size 
of social changes. In everyday life, a surprise is con-
sidered to be a change on a large scale, because the 
people who are given a surprise do not experience 
self-involvement in designing the surprise. It is argu-
able that participation in technological change can 
be achieved through participation in discussing or mo-
difying the narrative of the change, so it does not 
come as a shock. 
An important point is how to ensure the narrative 
does not cause a person to experience illusionary 
bias, denying the facts, and that the self-fulfilling 
prophecy produced bring about a higher quality of 
life (Wu, 2017). In addition, a decrease in self-enga-
gement can be caused by absorption of social men-
tality. Social mentality (synonymous with the con-
cept of a social mind, social intelligence) is “many 
individual minds in interaction, so playing upon one 
another that they simultaneously feel the same sen-
sation or emotion, arriving at one judgment and per-
haps act in concert” (Giddings, 1896, p. 134). Social 
mentality, despite having a locus in the individuals’ 
mind, is clearly a social creation, takes place through 
a communication process, is emotive-evaluative, and 
always persuades a person to reformulate the self 
(Gilbert, 2016). One’s self-consciousness does require 
the connectivity and recognition of other’s self-con-
sciousness but, in some facets, can “fall on” social 
mentality (Williams, 2000), especially those forms 
of social mentality which move further into herd or 
mob mentality (Price, 2013) [assigned experience] 
that has negative connotations (i.e. primitive, des-
tructive, and selfish). Thus, the necessary type of self-
involvement to produce a healthy social perception 
is an engagement which takes into account the com-
mon good, promotes caring (e.g. towards environ-
ment; Abraham, Pane, & Chairiyani, 2015), and res-
ponsibility of the self, can negotiate with, rather than 
be depressed by, others, or other powerful forces 
(cf. Abraham, Takwin, & Suleeman, 2017), and which 
demotes the negative effects of deindividuation. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
This present review concludes that self-involve-
ment and social rejection have influences on the per-
ception of social changes. Compared to those who 
have self-involvement or social acceptance experi-
ence, people with self-disengagement/uninvolvement 
or socially rejected experience, will have a percep-
tion of world changes of a bigger magnitude. This re-
view suggests new theoretical propositions in under-
standing social cognition, with social change as the 
object. The findings of this review can be used for 
education, counselling, and psychotherapy for those 
who are frustrated with the environment because they 
are unaware of their self-changes produced by the two 
predictor variables. 
The findings of this review could be used by po-
liticians, economists, social institution consultants, 
and cultural experts to create an impression for stake-
holders or constituents that the changes they create 
in the world are big changes, even seeming to be 
bigger than the real changes. This can be done by 
managing the level of self-involvement and rejected 
feelings of the subjects, guided by ethical considera-
tions. Further studies are suggested to follow up this 
review by investigating change direction. This re-
view focuses on the quantitative aspect of social 
changes (perceived to be more or less by participants, 
suggested to be measured by the statistical mean), 
but it has not delved deeply into the direction of 
social changes (perceived to be more positive/better 
or more negative/worse by participants). Empirical 
research on factors influencing the qualitative as-
pect of social change will be more interesting, and 
may expand the conjecture of this review. 
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